Th e main aim of this brief and purposely radical essay is to investigate further possibilities for empirical research in natural classifi cation of semiosis (signs as wholes). Before introducing emon -a missing term in the taxonomy of signs -we make a distinction between the natural and artifi cial, and between the taxonomic and meronomic classifi cations of signs. Natural classifi cations or typologies are empirically based, while artifi cial classifi cations do not require empirical test. Meronomy describes the relational or functional structure of the whole (for instance triadic, circular, etc. composition of sign), while taxonomy categorizes individuals (individual signs). We argue that a natural taxonomy of signs can be based on the existence of diff erent complexity of operations during semiosis, which implies diff erent mechanisms of learning. We add into the taxonomy a particular type of signs -emonic signs, which are at work in imitation and social learning, while being more complex than indexes and less complex than symbols. Icons are related to imprinting, indexes to conditioning, emons to imitating, and symbols to conventions or naming. We also argue that the semiotic typologies could undergo large changes aft er the discovery of the proper mechanisms or workings of semiosis.
at least potentially empirical arguments about the real classes to disprove or to improve the classifi cation. Otherwise the classifi cation is artifi cial. 1 Th e classifi cations of signs 2 used in contemporary general semiotics are very oft en those introduced by or stemming from the work of Charles Peirce. 3 Can there be any observation that could disprove the Peircean ten-fold typology of signs? Or the 28-or 66-fold? 4 No. Because these classifi cations are logically derived from the strictly triadic model, which by itself is logical and not empirical. Peircean typologies do not require an empirical research to be true. Th us, following the defi nition above, Peirce's classifi cation of signs is artifi cial. 5 Indeed, we can, in a way, compare the Peircean combinatoric taxonomy of signs with an algebraic classifi cation of geometric fi gures. For instance, it makes sense to build the best algebraic classifi cation of polyhedrons; this classifi cation will certainly be usable for describing real forms. However, a study of real forms cannot help in improving the mathematical classifi cation. In relation to the real variability of the forms of cells, or drawings, or signs, such classifi cation is artifi cial.
Th is is not a critique of Peirce. Peirce's system is algebraic. It is based on his minimal model of sign, which is triadic, and the system derived from it is using the tacit assumption that a sign in all its complexifi cations and plurifi cations carries the basic minimal structure. As a result, in the Peircean system, the diversity of signs is a triversity. 1 Th us we do not include logical mistakes into the class of empirical arguments. 2 In this article we use the terms 'sign' and 'semiosis ' as synonyms. Th is is based on the understanding that sign is -from one side -always a process, the sign process, sign pro cess being commonly called semiosis, and -from the other side, dually -sign is always a (simultaneous) whole. Th us representamen, object and interpretant are parts of sign. 3 On Peirce's classifi cation of signs, see the recent volume Queiros, Stjernfelt 2019. 4 About these Peircean classifi cations, see for instance Farias, Queiroz 2003 . See also Peirce 2015. 5 One should notice that this seems to contradict to what Peirce himself said: "All classifi cation, whether artifi cial or natural, is the arrangement of objects according to ideas. A natural classifi cation is the arrangement of them according to those ideas from which their existence results. No greater merit can a taxonomist have than that of having his eyes open to the ideas in nature; no more deplorable blindness can affl ict him than that of not seeing that there are ideas in nature which determine the existence of objects. Th e defi nitions of Agassiz will, at least, do us the service of directing our attention to the supreme importance of bearing in mind the fi nal cause of objects in fi nding out their own natural classifi cations" (Peirce 1965: 103, CP 1.231) . From here we can clearly see that Peirce's aim is natural classifi cation. However, we also see that, for him, the natural classes are limited to the systems organized by fi nal cause. Once we limit the existence of fi nal cause with living (or organic wholes), then it follows that Peirce's concept of natural classifi cation is inapplicable for non-living objects. Our defi nition of natural classifi cation is not limited to the systems with fi nal cause (as for instance, natural classifi cation can be found also for chemical elements). Cf Liszka 2019. Th e problem of sign classifi cation is not so simple, though. Semiosis is the process in which meaning arises or emerges. Meaning, by its nature, is logical and not a physiological or psychological phenomenon. However, on the biosemiotic level, it is logic in an extended sense. Peirce is describing the very fundamentals of logic, and because it is logic, one cannot test it via physiological or psychological experiments. Th is is the anti-psychologism of Peirce (Stjernfelt 2013) . Semiosis as the process in which meaning emerges is also a system of physiological processes, although which physiological processes was unclear for Peirce, and is not entirely clear even now. Still, since Jakob von Uexküll's studies it has been clear that in order to make meaning, there should be a functional circle. Uexküll gave a certain physiological description to such functional circles. Functional circles were Uexküll's model of semiosis (Krampen 1997) . While describing semiosis as functional circles is necessary, they do not yet provide suffi cient conditions for semiosis. Deacon (2011) has demonstrated the importance of constraints regenerating constraints which work reciprocally, to which we added the necessity of incompatible codes in simultaneity, or choice (Kull 2015; 2018) . Still, suffi cient conditions for semiosis have not yet been properly described.
Two questions follow: First, can we get any evidence as to whether the signs as they exist in real life are indeed triadic, and never, for instance, tetradic, or septadic, or maybe indefi nitely plural? Alternatively, perhaps signs are built so that their numerical characterization is irrelevant, or provide only an approximate model?
Secondly, should the general structure of sign be related to the existing classes of signs? In parallel, we might ask whether in biological classifi cations, the structure of species are related to the genera and familia that exist and the number of species these include? -Th e answer would obviously be 'no' . Why then should it be 'yes' in the classifi cation of signs?
To seek a natural, not artifi cial, classifi cation of signs, let us fi rst introduce the distinction between two diff erent types of classifi cations -meronomy and taxonomy of signs. Th is may help resolve some contradictions in the classifi cations found in the semiotic literature and may suggest a more systematic study of sign types. Following this distinction, we will describe a particular problem on sign typology found in semiotic literature, move to its solution, introduce the distinction between icon and emon, and fi nally address some earlier perspectives on the issue of semiotic typology.
Meronomy and taxonomy of signs
Taxonomy and meronomy are two complementary approaches to classifi cation or typology. Taxonomy joins individual objects into taxons (taxa) or classes, while meronomy divides a whole into merons or parts. 6 For example, in biology, taxonomy deals with classifi cation of species into genera, familia, etc., or individual communities into community types, while meronomy deals with classifi cation (partitions) of an organism into organs, or an ecosystem into its functional components (see Table 1 ). By parallel, in semiotics taxonomy would describe the types of signs -or of texts, or narratives, or sentences, or organisms, while meronomy would describe the structure of signs -or of texts, narratives, sentences, organisms.
Mereology can be defi ned as the study of meronomies. Typology is commonly understood as the study of taxonomies. Both are dealing with classifi cations. Both meronomy and taxonomy can be either artifi cial or natural. Partition of a sign can be described by a model in which the parts do not correspond to the empirically discovered parts of a sign -in this case the partition is artifi cial. Still, it is also conceivable that the described merons of sign correspond to real partsthen the meronomy is natural. Th e same is possible for taxonomies of signs -the 6 About these concepts, see for instance Meyen 1977 Meyen , 1978 Chebanov 2017 . On the applications of this distinction, see, e.g., Pavlinov 2016. Th e term 'meronomy' has been used especially by Russian scholars; it is the classifi cation of parts of a whole as a result of mereological approach or partonomy (see, e.g., Calosi, Graziani 2014). A clear formulation of the opposition 'taxonomy/meronomy' together with 'taxon/meron' was developed by Sergej Meyen (1977) . taxa in a taxonomy correspond to real taxa in the natural taxonomy, while there is no such correspondence in case of an artifi cial taxonomy.
Whether meronomy can produce a taxonomy?
Consider a functional partition of a simple whole into its natural parts. For instance, partitioning into three. Further, these parts, few in number, can also be partitioned using the same rule. Such two-level system is another whole, more complex, while still produced by the same partitioning principle. With this method, we can get the description of a large number of wholes, which are all products of the same partitioning principle. Th is is close to how Peirce produced the classes of signs. All taxonomic diversity of signs, according to his classifi cation, imply triadic meronomic partitioning such that new forms are extension of Peirce's logical triadic archetype -from the archetype of the whole and its limited possibilities of construction.
As repeatedly stressed by Frederik Stjernfelt, Peirce's classifi cation of signs is fundamentally a product of meronomic procedure (e.g., Stjernfelt 2000) . It deals with the functional structure of sign (as semiosis) and its components. Its triadic principle is derived from the assumed logical structure of semiosis itself which cannot be dismissed in any of its parts. Since the division into merons is relational, the resulting Peircean classes of signs are necessarily interdependent. New sign types are generated in Peircean semiotics by partitioning or combining the small number of existing types.
Th erefore, the possibility of a natural taxonomy of signs is not a trivial question -an artifi cial taxonomy may correspond to the natural taxonomy, and it may not. However, a natural taxonomy of signs is feasible if what is taken as the object of classifi cation is not an artifi cial logical model of semiosis but features of sign relations that can be independently identifi ed. Th is assumes that there can exist certain independent variability in subprocesses of semiosis as a whole.
How can we get to natural taxonomy of signs that can be tested? First, we should assume that there could emerge features of signs that are not logically deriveable from the basic model of sign. Second, we should assume the possibility of self-categorization or speciation of signs. Th us we should not assume that the whole taxonomy can be derived from the fundamental model or archetype of sign (although this does not exclude the possibility that the derivation from a good enough fundamental model may work). In this case, the testable natural classifi cation will be possible.
It is important to pay attention to the fact that at least for some aspects of semiosis, in certain limited groups of signs, rather good natural taxonomies already exist -for instance, in case of linguistic features of the elements of human languages, gestures, some groups of artefacts. However, and somewhat paradoxically, a general typology of signs has not yet achieved natural classifi cation. As mentioned above, Peircean classifi cation has not yet proven to be a natural classifi cation and may not be until tools to demonstrate its correspondence to a testable classifi cation are found.
In particular, we observe that the icon-index-symbol taxonomy has been used both as a logical product of meronomy and as a natural taxonomy. Peirce's typology is mainly mereological. Frederik Stjernfelt in his writings about Peirce interprets his typology as truly mereological. For Stjernfelt, the perception-action cycle is a natural proposition, with an argument-structure (even in a bacterium, indeed, "a very primitive" one); sign types are rather aspects of semiosis (Stjernfelt 2012) . In contrast, Th omas Sebeok's six-fold typology of signs is rather naturally taxonomical (or at least semi-taxonomical). 7 Also Terrence Deacon's typology in his Symbolic Species (Deacon 1997) , however based on Peirce, is an attempt at a natural semiotic taxonomy. Deacon temporalizes sign types: these appear in ontogeny one emergent from another with a symbolic threshold zone separating human language from animal and vegetative sign systems.
Let us now explore classes of signs in pursuit of a natural taxonomy, not by updating Peircean classifi cation which is the product of a particular meronomic model. Our approach below deals exclusively with a natural taxonomy of signs, which therefore should not be drawn from a fundamental sign model. Even accepting the Peircean triadic model of sign (triadicity belonging to meronomy), sign taxonomy can be achieved on an empirical basis without restrictions about the number of taxa.
The icon-index-icon-symbol paradox
In the semiotic literature we fi nd variable and incompatible usage of the names of sign types. For some researchers, all signs are called symbols because they are at least to a certain extent arbitrary. For others, two main sign types exist -pictorial (as if continuous) signs are called icons, and textual (as if discrete) signs are called symbols. For still others, all signs have indexical aspects because they all refer to something. 7 Th is distinction has been characterized by Umberto Eco as the diff erence between Peirceologists and Peirceans; Eco identifi ed himself with the latter (Eco 2014: 510) .
Nevertheless, icon, index, and symbol are very widely used both in semiotics and beyond as the three major sign types. Th at just three, and namely these three, became accepted as principal sign types has obviously happened due to Peirce's indirect infl uence. In parallel, oppositional (or diff erential, the binary) defi nition of meaning as supported by the Saussurean tradition works in the background and oft en modifi es the usage of concepts. A contemporary semiotician is infl uenced by both. Here, let us focus on Peircean triads.
In the literature on semiotics, there are two traditions for dealing with basic three sign types. One that corresponds to Peirce, uses the sequence icon-indexsymbol. Th e other (e.g. Roland Barthes's), uses the sequence index-icon-symbol.
It seems that there is no single source for taking index as fi rst. Barthes, when using the index-icon-symbol row (Barthes 1968: 37) refers to De l' acte a la pensée (1942) by Henri Wallon, who might be one responsible for introducing this "reversed" sequence. Yet it is likely that several authors have used the index-iconsymbol row just independently, up to recent times (e.g., Sadowski 2009 ).
Th us, index is sometimes understood as preceding icon, and sometimes as following icon. Th at is what I call here the icon-index-icon-symbol paradox.
A solution to the paradox: There are more sign types Th ere are two obvious solutions to this paradox. Th e fi rst, that either icon-indexsymbol or index-icon-symbol is wrong. Th e second, that there exist two rather diff erent types of signs that have both been described as icon; that means, icon 1index-icon 2 -symbol.
I shall argue for the second solution. Th is means that both sequences of the triad have their reasonable uses. Simply, in case of index-icon-symbol, icon 1 has not been noticed, while in case of icon-index-symbol, icon 2 has been ignored. Accordingly, both had their restrictions.
It is understandable that for those researchers who focus on human sign systems and particularly on language, the primary icon (icon 1 ) may be ignored. Such researchers would use the index-icon-symbol system, since the conditional learning resulting in conditioned refl exes and representing indexical relations is already so simple and elementary that there seems no reason to delve further. For example, imitation is an obvious candidate for iconicity. Since imitation is a more advanced capacity than conditional learning, it should stay aft er the indexicality (as icon 2 ) in the temporalized sequence of sign types.
For instance, when Juri Lotman used the iconic-symbolic opposition, he did not speak about icons in the sense of Peirce or Eco. Lotman's icons are rather of the second type (icon 2 ). 8 Th e fi rst type of icons (icon 1 ) is rather close to what Eco referred to as 'hypoicon' (Eco 1999: 339) .
Th us, the term 'icon' is used in two diff erent taxonomic senses -as simpler than index, and as more complex than index. 9 Indeed, resemblance is of two very diff erent types. Simplifying, the fi rst is based on indistinguishability, the second on similarity. Th e origin of these types of resemblance are either in the mechanism of recognition, or of imitation.
Despite the same names -icon, index, symbol -that Peirce is using in a diff erent sense (i.e. not about signs as wholes, but as the relations between representamen and object, thus rather as merons), there is already a common tradition of using these names also as names for separate sign taxa. Th e additional distinctions introduced next may resolve some controversies.
Emon -a missing term in the taxonomy of signs
We add here the fourth type (taxon) -emonic signs, a sign type between index and symbol, the icon 2 -the existence or lack of which in organisms' communication might be the reason for many behavioural diff erences. We make distinction between icons and emons and propose the sequence icon-index-emon-symbol. Doing so may resolve the ambiguous usage of the sequence index-icon-symbol instead of the original icon-index-symbol in some semiotic theories.
Th e word 'emon' as proposed here for the name of the sign type can be seen as a derivation from Greek 'ημων' ('ἡμῶν'), meaning 'company' . Occasionally, the term 'emon' has been used by Paul Nemirovsky to denote an element of emotional or aesthetic information (Nemirovsky 1999; Nemirovsky, Davenport 2002) .
Emon may thus be related to emotions, empathy, imitation. Note that imitative learning assumes the capacity for analogization, and accordingly, the processes of amplifi cation, which can possibly be identifi ed with emotions. Perhaps the mechanisms of imitation employs mirror neurons (see Wiedermann 2003; Panksepp 2011) . 10 Most invertebrates cannot use emons due to the lack of the relevant mechanism of learning. Emons are acquired via imitation or social learning, and exist in 8 It should be added that index did not belong to Juri Lotman's typology of signs, except on some specialized occasions (e.g., Lotman 1990: 26-27, 103, 111) . (I thank Silvi Salupere for this note .) 9 Th ere exists an extensive semiotic literature and decades-long debate on the defi nition of iconicity (see for instance Eco 1999: 337ff ) . 10 Cf. also a distinction between imitation and emulation in Bandura 2009 Bandura [1971 ; some other aspects of emonic kind of resemblance, see Williams, Colling 2018. animals with emotions. Emonic semiosis would be present in vertebrates (birds and mammals), not invertebrates (insects). Th e transition from non-imitating to imitating animals would be the emonic threshold zone.
Types of signs as related to the types of learning
Semiosis as interpretation diff ers from deterministic (or even algorithmic) processes by the potential for innovation. Th is cleavage between the deterministic and innovative systems is pointing to the semiotic systems as learning systems.
Learning itself is not the same as semiosis. Learning happens if interpretation (semiosis) leaves a trace (a scaff old) that infl uences further interpretations. Learning fi xes the link established in interpretation. 11 If the form of the link requires diff erent mechanisms of learning as dependent on the complexity of the link established, then certain correspondence between the types of semiosis (sign) and the mechanisms of learning should be the case.
Th e relationship between semiosis and learning can be described by the following steps or stages of this process: (a) incompatibility: what can induce a functional change is an incongruence of existing sign relations, a semiotic confl ict or untranslatability; (b) innovation: if several options (possibilities) are available simultaneously, then a choice-like switch may take place; this solves the incompatibility (cf semiosis as problem-solving) by using one option and removing the rest; it establishes a connection (link), commonly with the help of existing scaff olding; (c) habituation: this is how the new connection may become stabilized, and some times, partially inherited. Learning means that a relatively stable mediator will be built that carries the link (bond) established in interpretation. In other words, learning is memory-building. Diff erent complexity of the process demonstrates the possible relationship with diff erent mechanisms of learning: (i) iconic: if a link (the mediator) becomes reproduced, then this mediator, when linking, presents an operation of recognition; this would correspond to imprinting as a form of learning; (ii) indexical: if the connection is linking two separate recognition events, then it will produce preferably the bonds (relations) between those things that are co-present or correlated -thus the link presents the operation of association; this would correspond to conditioning as a form of learning;
(iii) emonic: if it is possible to link to a link, then it tends to produce a linkage that models (imitates) the whole pattern of a regular situation, producing a representation; this would correspond to imitating as a form of learning; (iv) symbolic: if it is possible to interlink representations, then it implies the possibility to compose any patterns (thus providing full open-endedness); also, since at that level, the patterns produced can be isolated (detached, independent) from the regularities; this would correspond to conventioning or naming as a form of learning;
Such typology describes the diff erent levels of morphological forms as constructed (designed) by diff erent types of semiosis as logical operations: (i) vegetative level: recognition, iconic -swarms, territories, lines, trees, bodies;
(ii) animal level: conditioning, indexical -centres, circles, spaces, homes;
(iii) emotional level: imitation, emonic -family groups, social customs; (iv) cultural level: replacement, symbolical -times, narratives, calculations, recombinations.
While this typology is stemming from the Peircean approach, its stress on natural taxonomy more than on mereology may require a wholly diff erent terminology, in order to avoid unnecessary polysemy. Moreover, there could be more taxa in this taxonomy than four. For instance, we could additionally distinguish between two types of recognition (in an analogy with the diff erence between iconic qualisign and iconic sinsign in Peirce), resulting in the following taxonomy of signs: (ia) percon, based on elementary recognition; (ib) nexon, based on categorization (collective recognition by the neural tissue); (ii) junction, based on association; (iii) emon, based on imitation (mimicking); (iv) nomon, based on composition (arranging, combination).
Discussion: Some comments on earlier works on emons
Th e idea about the existence of emon-like signs has appeared in the works of several semioticians. Below we point out some of these.
(1) Artifi ce Th e importance to add a fourth type of sign was also noticed by Roman Jakobson. He wrote:
Th e "artifi ce" is to be added to the triad of semiotic modes established by Peirce.
Th is triad is based on two binary oppositions: contiguous/similar and factual/ imputed. Th e contiguity of the two components of the sign is factual in the index but imputed in the symbol. Now, the factual similarity which typifi es icon fi nds its logically foreseeable correlative in the imputed similarity which specifi es the artifi ce, and it is precisely for this reason that the latter fi ts into the whole which is now forever a four-part entity of semiotic modes. (Jakobson 1985 (Jakobson [1975 Jakobson 1980: 22;  our emphasis in the fi nal clause, K. K.) W. C. Watt (1981: 430) has commented:
Jakobson provides the occasional shaft of light into Peirce's murky domain, as when [Jakobson 1980: 11] he observes that a signans may refer to its signatum by means of contiguity, similarity, and/or convention: that is, respectively by an index, an icon, and/or a symbol [notice the order! -K. K.]. He later [Jakobson 1980: 22] analyses these binarily (contiguous/similar and factual/imputed) and fi lls the missing cell in the resulting 2x2 matrix by adding the "artifi ce", or metaphor, which resembles the icon in asserting a similarity between signans and signatum but diff ers in that in the artifi ce the similarity is imputed rather than factual as in the icon. Th is new semiotic tetrachotomy should sharpen discussion among those so inclined.
Here Jakobson (1985 Jakobson ( [1975 : 214-215) uses the term 'artifi ce' in reference to Gerard Manly Hopkins, who wrote:
Th e artifi cial part of poetry, perhaps we shall be right to say all artifi ce, reduces itself to the principle of parallelism. Th e structure of poetry is that of continuous parallelism [...] . But parallelism is of two kinds necessarily -where the opposition is clearly marked, and where it is transitional rather or chromatic. [...] To the marked or abrupt kind of parallelism belong metaphor, simile, parable, and so on, where the eff ect is sought in likeness of things, and antithesis, contrast, and so on, where it is sought in unlikeness. To the chromatic parallelism belong gradation, intensity, climax, tone, expression (as the word is used in music) [...] . (Hopkins 1959 (Hopkins [1865 : 84-85; our emphasis, K. K.)
When speaking about artifi ce, Hopkins as well as Jakobson assign this only to arts. Largely coinciding to our observations about emon, the features of this type of sign are clearly such that its manifestation is certainly not limited to arts. It should also be noted that Jakobson uses a pair of binary oppositions in his defi nition -despite a reference to Peirce. Binary structures, of course, were not at all what Peirce himself would use. Yet, binary oppositions are more of a meronomic than of a taxonomic kind. Th erefore, for emon being a taxonomic unit, it would be misleading just to identify it with artifi ce.
(2) Synesthon William C. Watt (1987; introduced the sign type that he calls 'synesthon' , while calling this switch from the Peircean triadic classifi cation to a tetrachotomy a 'neo-Peircean approach' . He placed synesthons (that evoke similar feelings) between index and symbol (Watt 1987: 339) . Later, however, Watt (2011: 369) hypothesizes that "there are really only two fundamental kinds of signs, the synesthon [...] and symbol".
(3) Meme Emon as the sign based on imitation may seem to have some similarity with Richard Dawkins' concept of meme. However, there are several fundamental reasons why these two are deeply diff erent. Th e most important diff erence between them concerns the basic logical incongruence -meme is defi ned as based on replication (copying), while emon is defi ned as based on interpretation process. 12 From this many consequences follow. Th e replication process leads to the incorporation of meme (as an analogue of gene) into the neo-Darwinian model. Th e interpretation process as the one on which imitation is based, makes emon a concept of non-neo-Darwinian theory. Another aspect is that many writings in memetics mix up the symbolic and presymbolic level of signs, even if they mean that memes are signs (which they oft en do). And last but not least, by the end of the internet journal of memetics itself, it became clear to some proponents of memetics themselves that meme is not a good term. Later, the term has been used to denote only the forms of epidemic distribution (Marino 2015) .
(4) Returning to Peirce: the rhematic iconic legisign Peirce's ten-fold taxonomy of signs includes three kinds of iconic signs. Th ese are iconic qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign (all three being rhemes). Th e fi rst two (iconic qualisign and iconic sinsign) are simpler than indexical signs, while the iconic legisign is, in a certain sense, situated between index and symbol if mapped on the three-fold taxonomy of signs. Th e ten classes in Peircean taxonomy cannot be naturally ordered into a linear sequence, therefore such mapping is not unambiguous. Also, as said above, it is not entirely clear whether we could take Peircean classifi cation as natural. However, the features of iconic legisign fi t well what we have described here as emon.
Conclusion
One of the big problems that inhibits the development of semiotics is the absence of agreement on the basic terminology of sign taxonomy. Semioticians seldom agree on identifi cation of sign types. Semiotic textbooks are oft en incompatible in their sign typologies. However, a basic sign typology is indispensable to semiotics. Th e Peircean typologization of signs into ten classes -despite the clear defi nitions of these taxa -has been applied rather seldom in practical semiotic studies. More oft en a much simpler classifi cation is used. Th e aim of our essay was to build a mediating "scaff old" for moving from a simple three-fold typology of signs into a more detailed but still obvious natural taxonomy. We did it by describing the type of signs we called emons. Together with this, linking the sign types to the types of learning mechanisms, we tried to demonstrate a way to develop a natural taxonomy of signs that would open further possibilites for empirical semiotic research and the post-Peircean taxonomies.
We did not include the defi nition of sign (semiosis) itself in this work. If the model of sign will be substantially modifi ed (for instance, see some hints towards this in Brandt 2016 and Kull 2018) , then the implications can aff ect the analysis above. Indeed, we expect that both meronomy and taxonomy of signs will be fundamentally changed, when we shall truly understand the conditions in which sign emerges. However, we hope that the distinctions described above will open up a space for further studies in the fi eld of typology of semiosis.
Finally -can we really break the three, the triadic model of semiosis? Will this mean the non-acceptance of Peircean semiotics? No. Th is will just be a next steppost-Peircean (bio)semiotics 13 . 14 13 Th e idea about post-Peircean biosemiotics has been expressed recently by Alin Olteanu (2019) and Claudio J. Rodrí guez. 14 Acknowledgements. A part of this paper was presented at a semiotic congress in Nanjing (Kull 2014) . I thank Frederik Stjernfelt and Göran Sonesson for helpful discussions and Jeremy Sherman for improving the text. Th is work was supported by the Estonian Research Council grant PRG314.
